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INTRODUCTION
Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions highlights the critical term “paradigm shi,” which occurs when it suddenly becomes evident that earlier assumptions are no longer correct. The plurality of the scientific community studying this domain accepts the change. These paradigm-shiing events can be 
scientific findings or, as in the social sciences, a system shock that creates a punctured 
equilibrium, triggering a leap forward acquiring new knowledge.
In information warfare, the government lines of effort have been to engage fake news, 
intercept electoral interference, fight extremist social media as the primary combat the-
ater in the information space, and use the tools to influence a targeted audience to defend 
against an adversary that seeks to influence our population. The COVID-19 pandemic gen-
erates a rebuttal, or at least a  challenge, of the information warfare assumption that our 
government’s authority, legitimacy, and control are mainly challenged by tampering with 
the electoral system, fueling extremist views, and distributing fake political news. The fake 
news and extremist social media content exploit fault lines in our society and create civil 
disturbances, tensions between federal and local government, and massive protests that 
impact only a fraction of the population. We have seen with COVID-19, for example, pub-
lic health has a far more powerful effect on public sentiment and is more likely to create 
reactions of larger magnitude within the citizenry, which ripple out. These ripple effects 
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have been hard to predict. The long-term psychological, 
societal, and health impacts of COVID-19 events have 
still not yet unfolded. As an example, according to the 
National Bureau of Economic Research, no other histor-
ic pandemic event has affected the stock market as pro-
foundly as COVID-19.[1] 
SOCIETAL PRIORITIES
COVID-19 has provided an essential data set for un-
derstanding what matters to the population. The en-
vironmental aspect of cyber defense, linked to public 
health, has not drawn attention as a national security 
matter. As living beings, we react to threats to our liv-
ing space and the immediate environment. Jeopardiz-
ing the environment, intentionally or unintentionally, 
has historically led to the direct injection of fear and 
strong reactions in the population. Even unexpected 
accidents with environmental impact have triggered 
strong moves in public sentiment towards fear, panic, 
anger against the government, and challenges to public 
authority. One example is Chernobyl, which according 
to former Soviet leader Gorbachev was accredited as the 
reason for the Soviet collapse five years later as the pop-
ular lost faith in their government and their ability to 
protect their citizens.[2]
An adversary seeks effects that support its agen-
da and strategy. If an adversary engages in informa-
tion operations, there is a goal and endgame that it 
is trying to achieve. From the adversary’s perspec-
tive, what impact can it have on a US Presidential 
election, and does it matter whether a Democratic 
or Republican President is elected? What is the up-
side? The inference is concerning, and adequate 
resources are dedicated to addressing the prob-
lem.[3] However, if we look at the actual changes 
to policy outcome, the interference will likely not 
meet the intended goals of swaying the elections. 
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  US defense spending and its grand impact on the 
world order have been nearly consistent over the de-
cades. Even when presidents and political leaders have 
made drastic policy decisions, the actual change in the 
geopolitical landscape has been marginal. As a recent 
example, President Trump’s movement of troops from 
Germany to Poland, Belgium, and Italy is simply a re-
arrangement and a new geopolitical position. From a 
Russian perspective, with an increasingly more mil-
itary-able Poland and increasing commitment from 
several NATO countries, the US movement of troops 
out of Germany does not change the current situation. 
Until COVID-19, the return on the Russian information 
warfare investment was not present if the intended 
goal were to directly impact US policy and general sen-
timent. Groups and fragments of the population have 
been impacted, but the general population and large 
parts of the government and political machinery have 
been unaffected. We have seen that COVID-19 and in-
formation operations have fueled public health con-
cerns and those fears are producing sentiment swings 
and foreign influence at a higher magnitude.       
According to Kenneth Waltz, it is not what you do, but 
instead what you can do, that gives you the power.[4] A 
foreign adversary can gain more influence over popular 
sentiment through threatening to harm the immediate 
environment and public health, especially as these ad-
versaries do not subscribe to the same ethics, code of 
conduct, and playbook as the US. COVID-19 has shown 
that cyber-attacks which create environmental and 
health threats, even those with a very low probability 
of occurring, can cause drastic swings in sentiment. Cy-
ber-attacks that threaten public health and the citizens’ 
immediate environment put the government’s legitima-
cy, authority, and control under pressure, and trigger a 
significant decrease in citizen confidence in the current 
political leadership. The magnitude of such impacts 
can hardly be created by tweets and fake news, or rally 
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extremists on social media because these events can be 
proven false and quickly forgotten by the public. Still, 
plausible threats to health and environment have a last-
ing impact. 
Humans have survived thousands of years by learn-
ing and adapting to avoid threats to life and limb. There-
fore, cyber-attacks that trigger fears of threats to public 
health and personal life have a massive initial impact 
and lasting effects which influence general perception 
and policy.    
One such example is the Three Mile Island accident, 
which created significant public turbulence and fear and 
still profoundly impacted how we envision nuclear pow-
er. For a covert state actor that seeks to cripple society, 
embarrass the political leadership, and project to the 
world that we cannot defend ourselves, environmental 
damages are inviting.[5] An attack on the environment 
feels to the general public more close and scary than 
a dozen servers malfunctioning in a server park. It is 
tangible and quickly becomes personable and relatable, 
beyond what politically incendiary memes and social 
media storms can create.       
We are all dependent on clean drinking water and 
non-toxic air. Cyber-attacks on these fundamentals for 
life could create panic and desperation in the general 
public–even if the reacting citizens were not directly 
affected.[6]  
The last decade’s study of cyber has le the environ-
mental risk posed by cyber-controlled networks un-
addressed.[7] The focus on cybersecurity has included 
providing for restoration of information systems by in-
corporating detection, protection, and reactive capabili-
ties. From information security’s early inception in the 
1980s to today’s secured environments, we have become 
skilled in our ability to secure and harden information 
systems. The interest in critical infrastructure is to a high 
degree concerned with accessibility, dependence, and 
availability, that the systems are working, and restoring 
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their working condition aer an attack. However, the long-lasting impact of threats to human 
health or the immediate environment drives sentiment and affects policy more seriously than 
a temporary loss of service.  Environmental effects such as contamination of drinking wa-
ter, degradation of ecosystem’s functionality, toxic agents released, and flooding with massive 
soil erosion arising would be dramatic and long-term. Environmental damages and threats to 
our immediate environment are tangible and highly visible, as problems like flooding, loss of 
drinkable water, pandemics, biological hazards, mudslides, toxic air, and chemical spills direct-
ly affect the population and its surrounding environment. A failed computer server park does 
not drive media attention, nor can a few hundred tweets create such an impact on the public 
sentiment as a hundred thousand dead fish floating down a river because of an environmental 
cyber-attack. The environmental impact is visible, connects with people on a visceral level, and 
generates a notion that human existence is in jeopardy. Humans put survival first. 
Environmental damages trigger radical shis in the public mind and general sentiment. For 
a minor state actor, such as an adversarial developing nation, these attacks can be conducted 
with a limited budget and resources while still creating significant political turbulence and 
loss of confidence by a targeted major state actor’s population. Conflict and potential war, as 
mentioned, seek to change policy and influence another nation to take steps that it earlier was 
unwilling to take. The widespread anxiety and stress that can follow environmental damages is 
a political force worth recognizing, which COVID-19 has evidenced. Systematic cyber-attacks 
that threaten public health will likely generate influence with enough momentum to change 
national policy.        
LOSS OF LEGITIMACY AND AUTHORITY
Successful covert cyber-attacks that lead to environmental impact are troublesome for the 
government–the specific damage to systems and the challenge to legitimacy, authority, and 
confidence in the government and political leadership. The citizens expect the state to protect 
them. The protection of the citizenry is one of the core elements in the concept of a democratic 
government. The security of citizens is a part of the unwritten social contract between citizens 
and their government. The federal government’s ability to protect is taken for granted. If the 
government fails to protect and safeguard its citizens, its legitimacy is challenged. Legitimacy 
concerns not who can lead, but who can govern. A failure to protect is an inability to govern 
the nation, and legitimacy is eroded. Institutional stability can be affected, which destabilizes 
the nation. The political scientist Dwight Waldo believed that we need faith in government; 
for the government to have strong legitimacy, it has to project, deliver, and promise that life is 
better for its citizens. In a democracy, the voters need a sense that they are represented, the 
government works for their best interests, and the government will improve the quality of life 
for its citizens. In the Administrative State, Waldo defined his vision of the “good life” as the best 
possible life for the population that can be achieved based on time, technology, and resources.
[8] Authority is the ability to implement policy. 
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Environmental hazards that lead to loss of life and a dramatic long-term decrease in quality 
of life for citizens trigger a demand for the government to act. If the population questions the 
government’s ability to protect and safeguard it, the government’s legitimacy and authority 
will suffer. In the Three Mile Island accident, the event impacted sentiment and risk percep-
tion, even decades aer the incident, of how citizens perceived the government’s nuclear poli-
cies and ability to ensure that nuclear power was safe. 
President Carter needed to demonstrate the ability to handle the incident and restore the 
general public’s confidence in government policies. Environmental risks tend to appeal to the 
general public’s logic and emotions, especially uncertainty and fear, and a population that fears 
the future has instantly lost confidence in the government.
The difference between the Three Mile Island accident and cyber-attacks on infrastructure 
that create environmental damage is that, during the Three Mile Island accident millions of 
Americans had a real fear for their life and future when faced with the possibility of a nuclear 
meltdown. Cyber-attacks on our national infrastructure that threaten public health cannot be 
predicted or potentially contained. These attacks can be massive if they exploit a shared vul-
nerability. Consequently, the fear generated by Three Mile Island could, in retrospect, have 
been marginal in comparison to the fear caused by a large-scale cyber-attack on national infra-
structure.   
ENVIRONMENTAL CYBER DEFENSE
Defending US infrastructure from cyber-attacks is not only protecting information, network 
availability, and the global information grid. It is also safeguarding public health and the envi-
ronment, which affect the citizens’ lives, their health, and their immediate living environment. 
The COVID-19 epidemic demonstrated the magnitude of impact attacks on the immediate en-
vironment. The citizenry’s quality of life directly affects the confidence the population has in 
the government’s ability to govern. From a rogue and unethical adversary’s perspective, this 
represents an “opportunity” that the US needs to address by increasing the environmental 
cyber defense and clarifying the intersection between public health and cyber.  
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